Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, liberal democracy seemed globally ascendant. Yet in recent years, that trend has reversed, as countries across the globe have experienced downturns in measures of democracy. Leaders from Turkey to Venezuela have amassed ever greater degrees of power, a phenomenon that Thomas Carothers and Brendan Hartnett, writing in the Journal of Democracy, blame squarely on personal political ambition and behavior, not on the failure of liberal democracy to deliver a good life to its citizens. Such leaders have used their new powers to dismantle institutions of accountability and even assert control over the outcomes of elections, a process known as democratic backsliding. This has played out in countries as distinct as Bangladesh, Hungary, and the Philippines.
Ebbs and flows in democratization are not historically unique. What is extraordinary about this latest wave of backsliding is its effect on developed democracies, especially the United States, which has long been a global paragon of democratic strength and stability. In this context, analysts have offered a popular contrast between it and Brazil: As the United States shows signs of continual democratic decline, Brazil’s democracy has displayed resilience in the face of assaults on its institutions.
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Brazilian Resiliency
When Jair Bolsonaro first ran for the Brazilian presidency in 2018, observers both inside and outside Brazil regularly compared him to Donald Trump. Bolsonaro eagerly leaned into these parallels with some in the media calling him the “Trump of the Tropics.” Bolsonaro’s style closely mimicked Trump’s right-wing populism, and in many cases, he copied Trump’s policies. Ahead of Brazil’s 2022 presidential election, Bolsonaro insisted the results would likely be fraudulent and spread misinformation suggesting the country’s voting machines could not be trusted. After his electoral defeat, many of his supporters rioted, attacking government buildings in the capital that drew comparisons to the January 6th insurrection in the United States. Revelations then emerged that Bolsonaro and members of his administration had plotted a coup attempt to keep him in power. In the wake of this political turmoil, Brazil became the subject of international praise for its willingness and ability to hold Bolsonaro and his supporters legally accountable for their actions.
While it’s true that the recently passed “Dosimetry Law” lessened the sentences of Bolsonaro, the coup plotters, and the rioters, that law itself was the product of a democratic compromise, and it was passed via the existing legislative process. As we shall discuss, it therefore amounts to further evidence of Brazil’s democratic resilience. Brazil’s liberal institutions are the secret to its democratic success, and the United States would be wise to learn this lesson.
Constraints on Executive Authority in Brazil
Bolsonaro’s successful 2018 presidential campaign focused on endemic corruption, which was certainly real: Corruption claimed national attention after the famed “Operation Car Wash” revealed a massive money laundering and bribery scheme centered on state-owned enterprises.
Once in power, though, Bolsonaro argued that political negotiation and coalition-building were also manifestations of corruption. As is typical in Brazil’s multiparty system, Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party (PSL) did not win a majority in Congress but instead held a small plurality of the seats. Defying usual practice, the PSL refused to form a coalition with any other parties.
That refusal immediately complicated its legislative prospects. Bolsonaro opted for a confrontational approach to Congress, arguing that his mandate entitled him to enact his agenda without a coalition. He cast objections from Congress or the judiciary as the institutional manifestations of corruption, frustrating the will of the people. He relied heavily on executive actions to enact his agenda and encouraged popular mobilizations to pressure the other branches of government into compliance. He then lambasted members of the other branches who opposed his efforts as enemies of the people or obstacles to national well-being.
Despite the public pressure campaign, Brazilian liberal institutions successfully prevented Bolsonaro from consolidating authoritarian power and minimized the damage to democracy. Several factors contributed to this durability.
First, Brazil’s multiparty system meant that many right-leaning parties could diverge from Bolsonaro on key issues without endangering their re-election prospects. Free from the all too common negative partisanship of the American two-party system, Brazilian politicians could oppose the president’s actions without being accused of supporting ideological opponents. While the parties may be weaker in a multiparty system, the system itself proved a stronger check against an ambitious executive.
Second, executive action in Brazil is limited in scope and duration. Medidas provisórias, or provisional measures, allow a president to make immediate changes to law. But Congress is constitutionally required to consider the measures within 60 days, with one possible 60-day extension. Congress can either approve the measure, with or without amendments, and return it to the president for his signature, like a standard bill, or, if no action is taken, the measure expires and cannot be reissued within the same legislative session. Despite Bolsonaro issuing an unprecedented number of provisional measures, roughly 40 percent of them were rejected or allowed to expire, a far higher rate than that of his predecessors.
Finally, Brazil’s judicial system responded rapidly. The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil frequently stepped in to block unconstitutional actions or provisional measures from the administration. At the same time, Brazil’s electoral justice system, a separate department of the executive branch that oversees elections and investigates electoral malfeasance, pushed back on election misinformation and conducted investigations and prosecutions of election-related crimes. Importantly, Brazil’s judicial system operates on a civil law tradition that allows courts to intervene immediately on constitutional issues at the behest of any of several constitutionally approved stakeholders (Congress, political parties, the attorney general, etc.) without the need for standing or a case decision in a lower court, as needed in the U.S. system.
The Dosimetry Law
Some observers argue that Brazil’s recently passed “Dosimetry Law” threatens to upend the narrative around the country’s democratic resilience. In late April, Brazil’s Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass this legislation, which significantly reduced the legal penalties on the rioters, as well as Bolsonaro and his fellow coup plotters. While this action raises concerns about Brazil’s overall democratic strength, the way that the sentencing reduction came to pass, namely through the legislative process and coalition building, should be seen as further evidence of democratic resilience.
Despite concerns, the Dosimetry Law should not be seen as a setback. Brazil’s checks and balances remain unaffected. In fact, the law is currently on hold as the Supreme Court considers its constitutionality. Furthermore, the original version of the bill, introduced by Bolsonaro’s supporters in Congress, called for blanket amnesty. In a bit of irony, just building a pro-Bolsonaro supermajority coalition to pass the law and sustain it over presidential veto required significant concessions, of a sort Bolsonaro had refused while in power. We may agree or disagree with the motivations or effects of the Dosimetry Law, but it is superior to a blanket amnesty issued via executive whim, as seen in the United States for January 6th offenders. Not only did the congressional process prevent the most extreme version of the proposal from passing, but it also granted added legitimacy, having received the support of the vast majority of Brazilian elected officials across a broad ideological spectrum.
Lessons for the United States
Brazil’s experience holds three key lessons for political reform in the United States. This should come as no surprise; Brazil’s liberal institutions are not the product of inherent superiority, but of hard-earned lessons in a country that, within living memory, suffered under a brutal military dictatorship.
Brazilian political actors within Congress remained faithful to their ideological leanings while checking executive overreach from their side of the political spectrum. American legislators should have a similar ability.
In Brazil’s case, proportional representation for the lower house of Congress, and the multiparty system it produces, enabled a dissent from across the political spectrum. There are several electoral reforms that could be employed in the United States to allow for greater congressional independence, even if they do not immediately or ever produce a multiparty system. Chiefly, the United States could also implement proportional representation for the House of Representatives, which would likely produce a multiparty setup over time. All-candidate primaries, particularly like those in Washington state, where candidates choose their own party preferences, would not only give voters greater influence over who appears on the general election ballot, but they could also foster competition among different factions within the same ideological camp. Reforms like these, even without immediately creating multiple parties, could help break the paralyzing dichotomy currently at play in American politics, where members of Congress within the same party inherently sink or swim together. As seen in Brazil, more flexibility in partisan identity could strengthen the U.S. Congress’s role as a check on the executive branch.
Executive action should require congressional involvement.
Increasingly, the United States is governed, not by legislation, but by executive orders and administrative rulemaking. While Congress has the authority to repeal these actions, it is never required to address them, and simply ignoring them may be the easiest path politically. For years, members of Congress have proven more than willing to hide from responsibility and instead shift power to the president. Reform should place hard deadlines on unilateral executive actions unless they receive congressional approval. This problem is not new, and some members have introduced bills to this effect in the past, though Congress does not appear eager to push them through.
Though it’s more difficult than reining in executive orders, Americans should also reconsider the president’s enumerated powers under the U.S. Constitution. Presidential pardons have become more commonplace and more concerning. They now act as a shield for family, friends, and loyalists; presidential pardons simply don’t ensure impartial justice, as the Framers had intended them to do. Similarly, the line between the president’s power over foreign policy and the congressional power to declare war has become increasingly blurry. Though it would likely require constitutional amendments, greater congressional involvement on pardons and military actions would serve as a stronger check on a power-hungry executive. Brazil’s experience with its sentencing reduction law suggests that meaningful congressional involvement improves outcomes and limits damage.
The judicial branch should be empowered to react quickly and decisively to potential executive violations of the Constitution
American presidents are increasingly willing to push the limits of their authority, often daring the courts to intervene and relying on the fact that their actions will be difficult to reverse by the time legal challenges are resolved. This needlessly burdens the Supreme and lower courts, and it makes them the objects of political gamesmanship and ire. Political capture of the nation’s highest court in particular degrades its image among the American public. Congress should use its authority to expedite constitutional questions around the use of executive power to the Supreme Court and require quicker decisions in these cases. Doing so would not only empower the third branch to more effectively check the executive but also discourage future presidents from pursuing this institutionally destructive path.
Conclusion
Even as countries around the world, including the United States, have experienced democratic decline in recent years, Brazil has demonstrated that institutions can make a country resilient in the aftermath of direct assaults on democracy. The central lesson from Brazil’s experience is that liberal institutions, especially a functioning system of checks and balances, are the key to sustaining democracy. The U.S. Constitution is perhaps the most successful foundational political document in human history. However, that success is neither self-sustaining nor guaranteed. To ensure future success, the United States should learn three key lessons evident in Brazil’s experience. Political actors outside the executive branch need institutional space to successfully serve as a check, executive action should require congressional approval, and the judicial system should be amended to ensure rapid review of constitutional questions. By recommitting to liberalism, the United States can restore its democracy.
